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Abstract 
 
When innovation projects are crowdsourced, 
individuals are allowed to form teams and collaborate 
to develop a successful solution. In this environment, 
teams will be competing with each other, as only the 
winning ones take the award home. Should a worker 
work alone, so that she or he does not need to share 
the award when she or he wins, or should she or he 
form a team for a better chance to win? In this paper, 
we studied the behaviors of workers in the context of 
crowdsourced innovation projects (CIPs).  Building 
upon the theoretical framework of the organizational 
knowledge creation theory (OKCT), we linked team 
performance to team formation factors, including team 
diversity, team coordination, and task complexity. Our 
preliminary analysis showed that team coordination 
was an important factor for success. Team diversity in 
terms of connectivity was a positive factor towards 
better performance, whereas other factors were not 
significant. Our study indicates that workers in CIPs 
are likely to benefit from collaborations, connectivity 
diversity, and role diversity.  
 
1. Introduction  
 
Crowdsourcing refers to "using the Internet to 
outsource work to individuals" [15], which recently has 
been adopted as a new business model for innovation. 
Initially, crowdsourcing was introduced as a way to get 
small tasks done, such as image tagging (e.g., 
iStockphoto [3]), sentiment labeling (e.g., Amazon 
Turk [17]) and basic programming or editing tasks 
(e.g., taskcn [23]). These task-based crowdsourcing 
applications were supported by the economy of having 
work done cheaply [14] [18]. In these applications, the 
workers contribute small pieces of labor, which require 
minimal time and effort, and they did not have to 
collaborate with others to get the job done. More 
recently, crowdsourcing was also used for business 
innovation, such as new product design [2] [4] and 
problem solving [9] [24]. Idea contribution platforms, 
such as Dell’s IdeaStorm [2], allow individuals to 
contribute ideas, and get rewarded if their ideas were 
adopted. Coming up with novel ideas does require 
users’ basic knowledge of the company and the 
product, but the idea contribution action (i.e., posting 
comments on the forum) is still quite simple, without 
the need of collaborating with other contributors.  
In this study, we study and test theories in 
knowledge creation and organization theories in the 
context of crowdsourced innovation projects (CIPs). 
CIPs are defined as projects that are crowdsourced to 
the public with the intention of innovation. Data and 
existing insights will be released to the public to 
develop a solution, such as algorithms, automated 
systems, or insights, to be used in the organization for 
the longer term. From the business organization’s 
perspective, CIPs were crowdsourced for finding novel 
solutions more rapidly and more cheaply than hiring 
in-house experts [14]. It is also anticipated that novel 
analytical solutions will be proposed from the crowd, 
outside of the business organization. The most notable 
CIPs include the Netflix Prize, which has greatly 
improved the accuracy of predictions about whether a 
customer will enjoy a recommended movie, and 
inspired a new research domain in recommender 
systems. Since any person is allowed to try as long as 
she or he follows the basic rules, a cross-checking 
mechanism (i.e., comparing submission across 
different teams) was used for quality assurance. It takes 
tremendous amount of time to come up with a solution 
irrespective of quality. The workers have to download, 
analyze and create models to generate outputs for 
submission.  Given the complexity of the innovation 
projects, workers in the crowd are allowed to form 
teams. Each team would then have one or more 
members. Forming teams and collaborate effectively 
would be a new research issue in the CIPs context.  
In the new context of CIPs, we would like to test 
the applicability of knowledge creation theories and 
organization theories. The specific hypotheses we will 
test include: 1) whether team collaboration is a wise 
choice for workers in CIPs, and 2) whether more 
diverse teams are more likely to succeed. We will also 
explore whether externalization patterns could be 
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found between teams (in spite of the competition). 
Understanding the workers’ behaviors will provide the 
basis of theorizing the IS behaviors in this new context, 
and shed light on effective design of CIPs in the future. 
Our hypotheses and implementations can be 
summarized as follows. First, we hypothesize that 
forming teams, instead of working alone is beneficial. 
Second, we believe forming more diverse teams is 
beneficial. The diversity considered in this study is the 
mix of new and old members. This can be extended in 
the future. Finally, we materialize the efficacy of tacit 
coordination by examining whether each pair of 
members maintain their collaboration in the future. 
Since there is a large variation in all competitions 
hosted, we consider the moderating effect of 
competition difficulty, inspired by the task complexity 
theory. Our empirical analysis has partially supported 
these hypotheses, and we also attempted to provide 
evidences to the four communications patterns in the 
organizational knowledge creation theory. 
The novelty and contributions of this paper can be 
summarized as follows. Existing theories have not 
been tested in the new context of CIPs, which are 
based on an online platform that introduces both 
competition among teams (via the scoreboard) and 
knowledge sharing (via the discussion forum). Our 
study is the first to investigate the benefit of 
collaboration in CIPs, and the impact of other factors, 
such as team diversity and task complexity. 
 
2. Theoretical background  
 
In this study, we adopt knowledge creation and 
collaboration theories to build our research model, and 
test them in the context of CIPs. In particular, we adopt 
organizational knowledge creation theory (OKCT) as 
the overarching framework. According to the logic of 
tacit coordination theory and task complexity theory, 
we tested the relationship between performance and 
team diversity, task complexity, and team coordination. 
 
2.1 Organizational knowledge creation theory 
 
Organizational knowledge creation theory (OKCT) 
is a widely adopted theory in organizational and team 
knowledge management [29]. According OKCT, 
organizational knowledge can be classified as explicit 
knowledge (i.e., codified knowledge transmittable in 
formal, systematic language), and tacit knowledge (i.e., 
personalized knowledge that is hard to formalize or 
communicate, and rooted deeply in action, 
commitment and involvement in the context).  
Teams that work on CIPs are formed ad hoc and 
informal, explicit knowledge may not be regularly 
codified within the team, but could be indirectly 
inferred by observing the team’s performance. In the 
literature, the observable performance was commonly 
adopted as a proxy variable for explicit knowledge 
content [16][34]. Furthermore, tacit knowledge is 
personalized knowledge that is owned by individual 
members, not necessarily communicated formally (e.g., 
via meetings or documentation). She or he may acquire 
from or transfer to the team her or his tacit knowledge. 
Such within-team interactions, however, are hard to 
record or measure for CIPs.  
In the context of CIPs, there are arguably two 
possible layers of organization: the team level (i.e., 
each team consists of one or more members) and the 
community level (i.e., all competing teams who are 
allowed to participate in a common discussion forum). 
The interactions among members of the same team 
normally happen offline, and may not be easily 
observable, as teams tend to form offline among people 
with existing social ties. In fact, previous study has 
shown that in terms of the social ties among 
participants of the CIPs, there is a large number of 
connected components in the social graph, that are 
completely disconnected from others [24]. Coupled 
with the competitive nature of the relation among the 
teams, we can reasonably believe that the participants 
tend to be isolated online between teams, and rather, 
more fully connected offline within teams. A typical 
scenario is that a group of graduate students, who are 
well acquainted with each other in class, decided to 
form a team and work together on a CIP together. As a 
result, even though we have no information at the 
lower level organization (i.e., within the team), we can 
possibly measure interactions at the community level 
(i.e., on the discussion forum across teams). 
In the OKCT framework, organizational knowledge 
is created via four patterns of interactions: 
socialization, combination, internalization, and 
externalization [27]. Socialization is concerned with 
the exchange of tacit knowledge among individuals, 
and combination refers to the interactions to combine 
explicit knowledge as a group, through meeting and 
conversation or using information systems. 
Internalization refers to convert explicit knowledge 
into tacit knowledge, whereas externalization converts 
tacit knowledge into explicit knowledge. 
At the team level, since most interactions happen 
offline, we have no access to the information. 
However, since forum posts are visible to the public 
and allows for knowledge sharing outside of the 
participating teams, some of the four patterns in the 
OKCT framework could be assessed at the community 
level.  The discussion forums for CIPs are normally 
used for sharing knowledge or information. When 
users directly reply to each other’s posts, we consider it 
an action of socialization. All users that participated in 
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the forum discussions represent their teams who 
participated in combination (since all posts stay). 
Moreover, we can further separate forum posts into 
two categories: information acquiring and knowledge 
sharing. Information acquiring happens when a poster 
asks questions, seeking to internalize knowledge from 
the community. Knowledge sharing happens when a 
posts answers other people’s questions, seeking to 
externalize the knowledge.  
Note that interactions on the discussion forum are 
the primary interactions among the teams because they 
are not acquainted offline. We might contrast teams 
with an active forum member with those without. 
However, we cannot track the viewing log of 
participants, so it is hard to see which members 
combined knowledge from the forum without speaking 
up (i.e., posting a post). We can measure the 
socialization patterns in the CIPs community by the 
interactions on the forum.  
 
2.2 Team diversity 
 
The benefits of making teams in a competitive 
environment may seem obvious due to the general 
belief in better performance by more diverse teams, 
especially due to expertise coverage [16][21][34]. 
However, the theory has not been tested in CIPs. 
Possible benefits of forming teams with collaborators 
may include better chances to win (as empowered by 
the combined knowledge), and better retention (i.e., 
keep trying for a longer time), which in turn, will 
increase the chance to win, or at lease show 
improvement over time.  
However, there are also drawbacks for forming a 
team. First, if they win, they have to share the money 
with fellow team members, the expected reward, 
therefore, is substantially reduced. Second, there is 
possible collaboration cost, such as communication 
overhead (e.g., scheduling a meeting), flexibility in 
realizing personal ideas, etc. This can be especially a 
concern when the team is huge. Last but not the least, 
the competition rules normally limit at most one 
submission per day. If four people work individually, 
they could submit four times in total. (The rule does 
forbid sharing data across teams, to avoid purposeful 
reverse engineering.)  
H1: In CIPs, teams with multiple members perform 
better than teams with a single member. 
We believe that forming teams rather than 
competing alone has a number of benefits due to the 
dynamics of knowledge creation and knowledge 
sharing process, however, this benefit relies on 
effective team forming and collaboration.  
H2: In CIPs, for teams with more than one 
member, more diverse teams perform better.  
 
Even though we know very little about the 
participants’ background, and thus have no basis of 
judging for their skills diversity, we could measure 
other kinds of team diversity, i.e., experience, role, and 
connectivity diversities. In the context of small-group 
decisions, it was found that different diversity 
measures may have different effects on the decision 
efficacy [35]. In particular, in CIPs, we further 
established the diversity hypothesis into the following 
before testing them separately: 
H2a (Experience diversity): teams with both older 
and newer members are more likely to perform better. 
H2b (Role diversity): if some and not all of the 
team members use the forum, the team is more likely to 
perform better. 
H2c (Connectivity diversity): if the team has both 
more connected and less connected members (based on 
social network metrics such as connectivity), the team 
is more likely to perform better. 
 
2.3 Team coordination 
 
Coordination, either explicit or implicit, is the 
process of implementing teamwork, and is oftentimes 
defined as “the process of managing dependencies 
between activities” [26]. According to the visibility of 
coordination activities, Rico et al. [30] divide 
coordination into explicit coordination and tacit 
coordination. Explicit coordination refers to team 
members’ intentional use of explicit manners, such as 
communication, to articulate plans, define 
responsibilities, negotiate deadlines, and seek 
information to accomplish the shared goals [7] [26]. In 
contrast, tacit coordination captures the capability of a 
team to act in concert by predicting the needs of the 
task and the team members, and adjust behavior 
accordingly, without overt communication [7] [30]. 
Therefore, the two basic dimensions of implicit 
coordination are anticipation and dynamic adjustment 
[30]. That is, team members can formulate other 
members’ demands and actions by monitoring their 
progress with the task and their performance, and 
accordingly provide task-related information, 
proactively share tasks and adjust their own behaviors 
to keep in line with others’ work without previous 
requests or direct notification. 
The focus on explicit coordination is prevalent in 
previous research, which proves its undoubted 
importance. However, some studies acknowledge that 
explicit coordination only reveals one aspect of team 
coordination [30], and good coordination is nearly 
invisible [26] – but this does not mean that these two 
coordination mechanisms are opposite [30] [20]. 
Instead, prior research suggests that good coordination 
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is a subtle mixture of explicit and tacit coordination 
[10], so these two kinds of coordination process can 
exist at the same time, and well-developed explicit 
coordination can leverage the development of tacit 
coordination.  
Prior research about the explicit coordination 
mechanism suggests that team members coordinate 
explicitly by using task organization mechanisms or by 
communicating [8] [26]. However, task organization 
mechanisms such as planning and scheduling are less 
effective when the task has no or few routines because 
dependencies can no longer be managed in a 
programmed way [7]. Therefore, in our research about 
temporary CIPs, we focus on communication as the 
main tacit coordination mechanism, and it is also the 
dominant manner adopted by participants.  
Tacit coordination is considered as the primary 
form of team coordination in CIPs because there is no 
formal organizational designation of roles or positions. 
However, we could possible probe into the roles 
according to other activity records (e.g., forum). 
H3: Teams that coordinated better are more likely 
to perform better. 
 
2.4 Task complexity  
 
Task complexity has also been an important issue 
in IS theories, and applicable to our case. Task 
complexity is often considered as a moderator between 
teamwork and performance [1] [6] [12] [22] [28] [31]. 
In the context of CIPs, different competitions have 
vastly different levels of difficulty. Even though there 
is no direct measurement or indicator of level of 
difficulty, we can observe each competition’s award 
amount (which is normally positively correlated with 
difficulty and participation), and the number of 
participating teams (which represents the intensity of 
competition.)  
More specifically, task complexity can be included 
as a moderating variable. The level of difficulty is 
positively correlated with many of the following 
observable/unobservable factors: amount of 
price/reward expected; number of participating teams; 
whether the problem/data or the hosting company is 
interesting; and whether the problem is well defined or 
not. In this study, we simply use the number of 
participating teams (taken logarithm) as the proxy to 
task complexity. This is because it is not only easy to 
measure, but also directly affect the intensity of 
competition. After all, any team needs to rank on the 
top in order to receive the award. It also reflects the 
outcome of the other variables. 
H4: The relative performance of a team is not 
dependent upon the difficulty of a competition. 
 
3. Research design  
 
Our study is based on a real-world dataset from a 
popular website that hosts CIPs. In this section, we will 
introduce the operationalization details. 
 
3.1 Data collection 
 
Kaggle.com is an online platform that provides 
crowdsourcing solutions for companies and non-profit 
organizations to get access to a large pool of analytical 
expertise. This platform hosts one of the world’s 
biggest data science communities, which attracts 
experts from all over the world to participate in the 
CIPs, which are normally formulated as problem-
solving competitions. Each competition is normally set 
up by providing a brief problem description, a page 
with links for data download and documentation, and a 
pre-specified set of performance metric, general 
participation rules, and awards information. The 
winning team needs to beat naive baselines or an 
existing model. This requirement ensures that the final 
result will show substantial improvement over triviality 
or the state of the art. The competition rules at 
Kaggle.com usually require that winners describe their 
winning model in exchange for a prize, which is 
typically a pre-specified amount of money, and may 
include other types of awards, such as conference 
travel, plaque, and job positions. The competition rules 
may also limit the maximum number of members in a 
team, and/or the maximum number of submissions 
each day. Kaggle.com has hosted more than 200 
competitions in data science so far. 
For each competition, there is also a public 
scoreboard and a discussion forum. The public 
scoreboard dynamically reflects teams’ ranking, using 
a random subset of samples, when new submissions are 
being made to the website. Once a result (typically, the 
output from the team’s model) is submitted to the 
website, teams will be ranked according to the 
performance on a random partition (e.g., 30%) of the 
scoring instances and listed on the public scoreboard. 
The actual score on the full scoring set, which will be 
used to determine the winners at the end of the 
competition, is not released so that teams will not 
reverse engineer the results and over-fit the data. Given 
the competition among many teams, the best 
performing model typically improves the solution 
substantially. The discussion forum is where questions 
are asked and answered among all members of the 
Kaggle community, including Kaggle moderators. On 
the forum, there is a feature that allows users to click 
on the “thank” button to mark posts with useful 
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information. The number of thanks to each post is 
visible to all forum participants. 
The competition dataset was shared by Kaggle. 
This dataset includes the competitions information, the 
submission records, and the team-membership data. 
The competitions data include summary information of 
the competitions, such as award amount, number of 
teams participated, and number of entries submitted, 
which could be used to infer task complexity. The 
submissions data includes all teams’ submission 
history and their ranking on the public scoreboard, 
saved in CSV files. Each submission is associated with 
a timestamp, the performance score (by the pre-
specified metric, such as misclassification rate or F1 
measure), and the temporary (i.e., at the time of 
submission) and final (i.e., at the end of the 
competition period) ranking. After filtering out non-
public competitions and those that were still in 
progress at the time of data collection, our preliminary 
dataset included 40,377 submission records to 57 
competitions.  
A second part of the dataset consists of the forum 
discussion activities, which was crawled using Python.  
We were able to clean and match 44 of the 
competitions to our preliminary set of competitions. 
The crawled information was then formatted into a 
CSV table, where each row corresponds to a post 
(including the initiating post and the follow-up replies), 
and the columns include the author (identified by 
username), the thread (identified by post title), the 
sequence number in the thread, and the number of 
“thanks” received from others. We can track each 
individual member’s activities on the forum by their 
identifiable user names. Different from the public 
scoreboard data, the forum posts are submitted by 
individual team members, and thus we can differentiate 
the roles of those individuals in the team (i.e., whether 
a forum user, who communicates outside of the team 
with the whole community). Even though we have not 
performed a text mining and/or content analysis on the 
posts, we were able to easily quantify the value of 
content contributed by each user using the number of 
“thanks”. In the future, we can also do text mining to 
find out the quality, content, or contribution of each 
post. 
 
3.2 Extraction of social network metrics 
 
A social network is typically modelled as a graph 
structure, where nodes represent actors of the system, 
and edges represent their relations. As a result, many 
graph based methods and tools are applicable for 
solving problems formulated in the social network 
context. A thorough text of related concepts and 
examples may be found in [13] or [5]. Extracting the 
wisdom of the crowd through social network analysis 
has also been found to be effective in many 
applications [10][32]. 
Since each team may have one or more members 
on Kaggle (and a member can only participate in one 
team that submits to a competition), the relationship 
between teams and members may be represented and 
analyzed as a bipartite graph. The bipartite graph, also 
known as two-mode network or affiliation network, is 
a special type of graph that is particularly suitable for 
modeling the relationship between two types of entities 
[25]. It is common practice to project a two-mode 
network into one mode, so that existing (one-mode) 
network analysis techniques may be readily applied. 
This approach is particularly useful when the primary 
interest is on the relationship among one of the modes. 
In our case, it is interesting to look into the social 
relation among individual members to assess their 
connectivity.  
The team-membership data were used to create the 
affiliation network, based on which we constructed the 
social network among individual participants. 
Essentially, we link two individuals in the social graph 
if they have ever collaborated in any one or more 
competition. Our preliminary dataset included 30,142 
links among 26,971 teams that involve 19,277 unique 
members. Using the igraph package in R, we were able 
to easily create a bipartite graph between teams and 
members, map it into the member-member social 
network, and then calculate the degree centrality (i.e., 
number of directly connected members) for each 
member. Finally, we calculated the variance in team 
member’s degree to represent the team’s connectivity 
diversity. 
 
3.3 Partially observed team characteristics 
 
We would like to infer the efficacy of the team’s 
knowledge creation process, which is reflected in the 
performance (e.g., ranking or score) or activities (e.g., 
number of attempts) of the teams. Even though there is 
no formal explicit and tacit knowledge data available, 
we started by using team performance as a proxy 
variable to represent the amount of knowledge.  
Tacit or implicit coordination is not observable, so 
we began by quantifying the overall compatibility 
between pairs of team members. Even though there is 
no chance of surveying team member’s satisfaction 
during the collaboration process, we could observe the 
team composition to see if the members continued to 
collaborate in the future. A team with good tacit 
coordination should result in positive collaboration 
experience, and the members are more likely to 
continue to collaborate in future. As a result, for each 
pair of members in a team, we calculated the ratio 
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between the number of competitions they collaborated 
and the number of all completions that either of them 
participated (i.e., the Jaccard coefficient) afterwards.  
Since tacit coordination is unobservable, we could 
build a hidden Markov model (HMM) to represent the 
“health” status of a team. HMM was successfully used 
in the literature to infer patients’ health statuses based 
on their online activities [33]. Evolution of team 
performance over time can be tracked and used as 
external evidence of collaboration status. We adopted 
HMM to estimate the latent satisfaction for team 
performance.  
 
3.4 Operationalization of variables 
 
For each competition, we summarized a number of 
variables for each participating team. Table 1 provides 
definitions and operationalization of variables that we 
included in modeling.  
 
Table 1: Operationalization of variables (i = 
team, j = competition) 
Variable Description Measurement 
Dependent Variable: Team Performance 
ijP   
Team 
Performance 
Percentile (ranging from 0 to 1, 
where 1 means the best 
performance) of the best score 
of team i in competition j 
amongst all submissions on the 
scoreboard. 
Independent Variable: Team Diversity 
iVe  
Experience 
Diversity 
Entropy (0-1) of the proportion 
of new members.  
iVr  
Role 
Diversity 
Entropy (0-1) of the proportion 
of forum users. 
iVc  
Connectivity 
Diversity 
The variance in members’ 
degree centrality in the social 
graph.  
Independent Variable: Team Coordination 
ijC  
Team 
Coordination 
The average of the pairwise 
satisfaction score among team 
i’s members at the end of 
competition j 
Independent Variable: Task Complexity 
jD  
Competition 
Difficulty 
Number of teams that 
participated in competition j, 
taken logarithm 
 
The dependent variable, team performance, is 
measured as the percentile of the best score of team i 
toward competition j, amongst all submissions to this 
competition. In order to build a regression model to 
explain team performance using other variables, we 
transformed it into the logit score, so that the 
dependent variable follows a Normal distribution.  
The first independent variable, team diversity, 
could be measured in various ways, such as experience 
diversity, role diversity, and connectivity diversity. For 
experience diversity, we calculated the entropy based 
on the proportion of new members among all members 
of team i. A new member is defined as one who was 
never part of a team that made a submission to any 
other competition before the request date.  Note that 
there is a large number of teams with just one member, 
for which the diversity is zero. Combined with other 
teams that have either new users only or experienced 
users only, the number of teams with some diversity is 
very small. We then decided to dichotomize this 
variable: whether the team has diversity or not. Similar 
treatment was done to role diversity as the entropy of 
forum users. The connectivity diversity is measured as 
the variance in degree centralities of team members 
when assessed in the context of their collaboration 
social network.  
The second independent variable, team 
coordination, is calculated as the average of all 
pairwise coordination satisfaction scores. The 
coordination satisfaction score of any given pair of 
members, say, A and B, is calculated as the number of 
competitions that A and B completed together later 
than competition j, divided by the total number of 
competitions that either A or B participated later than 
competition j (up to the end of the study period).  
The third independent variable, task complexity is 
measured by the number of unique teams that 
participated in the competition, taken logarithm. The 
actual task complexity was not directly measurable. 
The most accurate indicator would be the award 
amount, as judged by the competition sponsor. 
However, such award amount is also a function of the 
sponsor’s brand value and the importance of the 
problem to the sponsor. The number of participating 
teams, therefore, is the most direct and practical to 
measure how difficult it is to win. Since the raw values 
have a highly skewed distribution, we started by taking 
the log transformation. After looking at the distribution 
of the transformed values (i.e., log counts), we decided 
to discretize into a three-level ordinal variable. 
Namely, high, medium, and low levels of difficulty. 
 
3.5 Empirical Model 
 
Our empirical model can be summarized as 
follows, where we vaguely use V to represent one or 
more types of team diversity: 
ijjiji
ij
ij
DCV
p
p
 









3210
1
log . 
Our goal is to explain teams’ performances by the 
team’s diversity, coordination, and the competition’s 
level of difficulty. Note that according to our data 
processing setup, experience diversity is a dummy 
variable, and competition difficulty is a three-level 
categorical variable. 
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4. Findings  
 
In this section, we report initial findings. Overall, 
we found that collaborations are helpful. Teams that 
involve multiple members perform much better than 
those with just one member. Using one competition as 
an example, and by modeling the latent states of each 
team over time, we found that collaboration is 
particularly helpful for teams that rank in the middle. 
Our comprehensive empirical models indicate that 
team coordination and connectivity diversity are 
positively associated with performance, whereas the 
experience diversity is not. The competition difficulty 
was found insignificant.  
 
4.1 Collaboration is good for CIPs 
 
The first thing we looked at was the team size. In 
our dataset, the team size had a highly skewed 
distribution. More specifically, there were 10346 one-
member teams, 512 two-member teams, 162 three-
member teams, 51 four-member teams, 27 five-
member teams, and the remaining 32 teams with six or 
more members. Since the distribution is so skewed, we 
combined the teams with more than one member, and 
focused on comparing between single-member teams 
and multi-member teams. 
We noticed was that it was rewarding to team up 
with others rather than working alone. When 
comparing teams with just one member (called 
“singles,” the same hereafter) and those with multiple 
members (called “multiples,” same hereafter), we 
found that the former (n=10346) performs much poorer 
than the later (n=784).  
More specifically, the singles teams have an 
average of 0.013 in logit scores (that is, roughly 50.3% 
of other submissions were worse than them) of 
percentiles (SD=1.729); and the multiples group has an 
average of 0.744 in logit scores (that is, roughly 67.8% 
of other submissions were worse than them) of 
percentiles (SD=1.960), with a low p-value. It is not 
surprising that a test with so large a sample size tends 
to be highly significant, however, the gap in the 
average performance (i.e., effect size) is quite large, 
too. This indicates that it is more likely to succeed 
when teaming up with others, rather than working 
alone. Therefore, H1 is well supported. 
 
4.2 Collaboration has different effects for 
teams in different latent states 
 
Thinking about the root why teaming up would 
help competitors perform better, we used the HMM 
model to estimate the latent state of each tem. Using 
one competition as an example, while tracking the 
progress over time, we categorize the “health” of each 
team into one of the following three levels: Good, 
Medium, and Bad. HMM is a commonly used model to 
estimate a latent variable that may change over time.  It 
represents all the unobservable information within the 
team that could lead to externally reflected team 
performances (e.g., ranking, or logit score of 
percentiles).   
Table 2 and Table 3 are the transition matrices 
among the three states, for singles teams and multiples 
teams, respectively. We can find several patterns by 
comparing the two transition matrices.  
 
Table 2: Transition Matrix for Singles 
  Good Medium Bad 
Good 0.80 0.20 0.00 
Medium 0.00 0.33 0.67 
Bad 0.22 0.00 0.78 
 
Table 3: Transition Matrix for Multiples 
  Good Medium Bad 
Good 0.57 0.00 0.43 
Medium 0.26 0.74 0.00 
Bad 0.00 0.39 0.61 
 
First, for mediocre players, if they stay single, they 
have very little chance to get to the good level, and a 
high chance (67%) to become bad. However, if they 
team up with others, their team status has quite some 
probability (26%) to become good, and very low 
probability to become bad. Thereby, for medium level 
workers, it would be quite beneficial to form or join a 
team.  
Moreover, for good workers, if they stay single, 
they have very low probability to become bad. 
However, if they form a team with others, their 
chances of staying good reduces from 80% to 57%, 
and their chances to become bad also increases 
tremendously to a (43%). It is possible that people who 
are proficient working alone (i.e., good singles) would 
more easily manage the work on their own and avoid 
the collaboration overhead.  
Finally, workers in the bad state are likely to stay 
bad (78%), or become good (22%) when they work 
alone. However, if they were part of a team, they have 
very little chance to become good, in spite of a reduced 
chance (61%) to stay bad. This indicates that “bad” 
teams do not benefit from collaboration. 
 
4.3 Positive factors for success 
 
After operationalizing the variables, we found a 
sample size of n=334 teams with complete data, upon 
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which our regression analysis will be performed. The 
teams in our dataset consists of 39.5% high 
collaboration satisfaction, 28.4% high experience 
diversity, and 43.7% connectivity diversity cases. 
Moreover, the difficulty levels of competitions are 
18.0% high, 45.2% medium, and all others low.  
 
Table 4: Regression Analysis Results 
Variable Est. S.E. t p 
C 0.249 0.113 2.21 0.028 
Ve -0.128 0.124 -1.03 0.305 
Vc 0.538 0.112 4.81 < 0.001 
D=High  0.105 0.187 0.56 0.575 
D=Low  -0.224 0.156 -1.44 0.151 
 
The regression modeling results are reported in 
Table 4. We found that team coordination satisfaction 
(p=0.028) and connectivity diversity (p<0.001) were 
statistically significant, whereas all other variables 
were insignificant.  The results support H2b and H2c 
and does not support H2a. Note that competition 
difficulty was insignificant in all cases, meaning that 
no matter whether the competition is hard or easy, the 
same conclusions hold. 
 
Table 5: Regression Analysis Results with 
Subsample (teams with forum users) 
Variable Est. S.E. t p 
Model with Role Diversity 
C 0.096 0.153 0.63 0.532 
Ve -0.158 0.165 -0.96 0.340 
Vc 0.534 0.155 3.44 < 0.001 
D=High  0.004 0.264 0.02 0.987 
D=Low  -0.415 0.206 -2.01 0.046 
Vr 0.625 0.170 3.68 < 0.001 
Model without Role Diversity 
C 0.099 0.159 0.62 0.534 
Ve -0.169 0.171 -0.99 0.324 
Vc 0.623 0.159 3.91 < 0.001 
D=High  -0.109 0.273 -0.40 0.689 
D=Low  -0.329 0.213 -1.55 0.124 
 
With a subsample of 44 competitions, we attempted 
to test whether role diversity, in terms of who 
communicates to the community at the forum, was a 
significant factor.  Table 5 reports the regression 
results with and without role diversity as an 
independent variable. Note that our sample size has 
been further reduced, but connectivity diversity 
remains highly significant. The role diversity is found 
significant, too, but team coordination, no matter 
whether role diversity is involved, is no longer 
significant within this subsample.  This likely indicates 
that for this subsample (i.e., those with forum data) 
role diversity is a much more predictive independent 
variable than team coordination. This is reasonable 
because, by our operationalization, a team has role 
diversity if some (not none, and not all) members 
communicates externally via the forum. Such action 
indicates likely explicit coordination, which discounts 
the value of implicit coordination. 
 
4.4 Evidences in interaction patterns 
 
At the community level, we wanted to check the 
interaction patterns between team members and the 
community. In particular, did the performance 
correlate with contributions to outside of the team (i.e., 
in the forum)? Figure 1 shows a comparison in terms 
of number of the composition of better or worse 
performing teams (i.e., whether their performance was 
among the top half of participating team) by different 
levels of forum contribution. The forum contribution is 
measured as the average number of thanks per post. 
There is a large group of teams who either do not use 
the forum, or receive no thanks on average (first bar). 
We see that a majority of these teams belong to the 
underperformer group.  The better performing groups 
take larger proportions for groups with more forum 
contributions. This is consistent with one would 
expect: those who create more knowledge internally 
are more likely to externalize to the community. 
 
 
Figure 1: Performance vs. forum contribution 
 
5. Discussions and implications 
 
Our preliminary analysis indicated that in the 
context of CIPs, team coordination is likely a factor for 
success in this environment. Even though collaborating 
with others is not required, competing as a team is 
likely is better choice, especially for teams with 
medium level of performance. When they do, they are 
more likely to perform better, and stay active for 
longer time, which in turn, increases the chance of 
winning.  
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Our analysis did not find support in the benefits of 
experience diversity. The same results hold irrespective 
of the level of difficulty. However, further exploration 
of the data, including other variable operationalization 
approaches, might be worthy of further investigation. 
 
5.1. Implications for research and practice 
  
Understanding the workers’ behavior helps us 
better design an innovation project. In particular, our 
analysis supports the practice of allowing workers to 
form teams, or work alone if they feel more beneficial. 
Our findings in significant benefits in connectivity and 
role diversity may also indicate that setting different 
roles (more/less connected to others) or responsibilities 
(some use forum to communicate with the outside) 
would be beneficial.  
New theories are needed in the new context of 
CIPs. There are inherent differences in different types 
of crowdsourcing tasks and thus the user commitment, 
responsibility in quality control and incentives are all 
different. Informed by this study, we should be able to 
further develop theoretical analysis on optional project 
design. The current literature all assume simple 
crowdsourced tasks and tasks like all-pay auctions.  
 
5.2 Challenges and future research 
 
Even though a team is like a team in the 
organization, and the team members can collectively 
decide which projects to spend time on, the 
crowdsourcing market might be quite different/novel in 
contrast to teams in an organization. Moreover, there is 
a two-layer community in a competition environment. 
This scenario is also possible in a company with many 
teams who work on related problems, and can compete 
for projects. The OKCT did not consider the two-layer 
framework and thus could be extended.  We could not 
fully track the interactions within teams which can be a 
limitation. In the future, we are interested in 
developing new theories in the context of open 
innovation; and empirically and theoretically analyze 
the open innovation design for achieving 
organizational goals in innovation. Since members 
work on different projects with different people over 
time, it will also be interesting to study the knowledge 
spillover effect. For example, how do knowledge 
transfer from one team to another through a member’s 
participation?  
More thorough intra-team analysis will be 
insightful for identifying the different roles and team-
level decision making processes. First, how do each 
team decide to work on which CIPs? When several 
competitions are open concurrently, a team’s decision 
on taking part in one competition rather than another 
may help us understand their preferences [19]. We will 
infer the utility function of each project to a team, 
which is set up as a monotonous and quasi-concave 
function depending on reward types including the 
amount of money award, the number of award types, 
the level of kudos, the knowledge required by the 
project. Therefore, a team can be classified into a 
certain type according to preference characteristics. 
Inferring the utility function of each project to a team, 
according to their participation behaviors, will be 
useful for predicting the sensitivity of incentives. The 
outcome of will inform decision makers for developing 
new crowdsourcing projects in a cost effective way. 
For example, for a given analytical problem, how 
much do I have to offer in order to collectively 
improve my prediction by 10%? 
Finally, it will be interesting to extract individual 
metrics from forum posts, using text mining techniques 
to infer each individual’s incentive, role and activeness 
in the team(s).  
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